Summary: Commonly (mis)understood to be only a power of quashing, Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) is much broader in ambit. The Section recognises the inherent jurisdiction High Courts in India have in dealing with criminal matters, including the power to prevent abuse of process of “any court” or pass orders to “secure the ends of justice”.
In the present case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld an order by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court under Section 482 CrPC, directing registration of an FIR. It was clarified that an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar on exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Where the commission of an offence is disclosed, police is duty-bound to register an FIR.
INTRODUCTION
On September 10, 2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed a judgement in Vinod Kumar Pandey v Seesh Ram Saini and Ors[1] (“Vinod Kumar Pandey”), inter alia, directing the registration of an FIR against two former CBI officers.
While this direction grabbed headlines, the significance of the judgement lies in the underlying issues and their treatment by the Apex Court, particularly, upholding the Delhi High Court’s order under Section 482, CrPC, for registration of an FIR.
The Appellants, among other things, contended that the complainant did not follow prior process for registering an FIR and had an alternate remedy. Hence, the exercise of inherent jurisdiction was unwarranted and the order directing registration of FIR ought to be set aside.
We consider how this was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Pandey.
SECTION 482 CrPC: INHERENT POWERS UNDERSTOOD
For a contextual understanding of the issue, it would be pertinent to briefly consider the scope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS).
A common misconception is that Section 482 CrPC is the High Courts’ power to “quash” a criminal proceeding.
However, this would be a very restrictive construction of the provision, as is evident from a plain reading of the Section.
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
Thus, Section 482 CrPC recognises the inherent power of the High Court to “prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice”. It is not a power conferred by the CrPC/ BNSS. Rather, it is codification of the power inherent in High Courts.
Evidently, the power under Section 482 is wide and not limited merely to quashing criminal proceedings.
Illustratively, it extends to issuing a direction to register an FIR – as was done in Vinod Kumar Pandey.
APEX COURT’S FINDINGS
A specific challenge to the High Court’s order was on the ground of the complainant omitting prior steps for registering an FIR and the High Court directing the registration of an FIR nonetheless.
In other words, there was a process which was not followed and an alternate remedy which was not exercised. Hence, the High Court ought not to have exercised inherent jurisdiction to register the FIR, when the underlying process was not followed. We have recently written on the steps to be taken for registration of an FIR prior to approaching a judicial forum (the Ld. Magistrate) for a direction. It is accessible here.
Negating this contention, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that while the High Courts ought not to routinely exercise inherent powers when there is an alternate remedy, the mere availability of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar for exercising inherent jurisdiction. The Court referred to its judgement in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P.[2]for this proposition.
Citing Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi),[3] the Court further held that availability of an alternate remedy is no ground to refuse a direction to register an FIR, once a cognizable offence is made out.
The Court also referred to its recent judgement in Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr[4], where the complainant had approached the Ld. Magistrate directly for seeking registration of an FIR without exhausting the prior remedies. The Court had held it to be a mere procedural irregularity, since the Magistrate otherwise had jurisdiction to pass the order.
In this backdrop, the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the directions of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court for registration of FIR, holding “if the Constitutional Court has exercised its discretion in entertaining the petitions and directing for the registration of the FIR against the two officers, on being satisfied that the commission of a cognizable offence is prima facie made out against them, we see no good reason to interfere with such discretion”.
OUR VIEW: SELECT TAKEAWAYS
The Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle that once a cognizable offence is disclosed, the police cannot refuse to register an FIR. The exercise is to evaluate the complaint/ materials (if any) and consider whether the allegations made therein disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. Once that is found, the police is duty-bound to register an FIR and cannot refuse to do so.
Similarly, the exercise of inherent jurisdiction by a High Court for registration of an FIR can neither be faulted nor refused, once the complainant prima facie makes out the commission of a cognizable offence. Thus, the principal consideration, once again, is determining whether a cognizable offence is disclosed.
Another aspect worth noting is the reliance on the recent Anurag Bhatnagar judgement. In our previous article, we had indicated that it would be interesting to see how this judgement is treated in future matters. While the facts in Anurag Bhatnagar and the present matter (Vinod Kumar Pandey) are different, the Court has relied on the principle laid down in Anurag Bhatnagar that if the court otherwise has jurisdiction, not availing alternate remedies would at best be a procedural irregularity and cannot be the ground to vitiate the order passed by the court.
While it may be too early to say this definitively, the Anurag Bhatnagar and Vinod Kumar Pandey judgementsmay signal a slight recalibration of the approach in such situations.
Perhaps the most important take away is how the Apex Court negated the objection on alternate remedy/prior steps as a ground to set aside the order of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court. First, it clarified that the mere availability of an alternate remedy is not a complete bar on exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Put differently, just because an alternate remedy could be availed, cannot be the sole reason to sustain a challenge to exercise of inherent jurisdiction by the High Court. Second, the Court further held that once a cognizable offence is made out, the existence of an alternate remedy cannot be the basis for the High Court to refuse to exercise its inherent power to direct the registration of the FIR.
The Apex Court has thus reinforced the first principles regarding registration of an FIR, while providing further clarity on the scope of the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.
[1] SLP (Crl) 7900 of 2019
[2] (2008) 2 SCC 409
[3] (2006) 2 SCC 677
[4] 2025 INSC 895