The Hon’ble Supreme Court (“SC”)[1] debated on the seminal question of maintainability of writ petitions against an order/ award under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (“MSME Act”). In M/s Tamil Nadu Cements Corporate Limited v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council and Another[2] (“
Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (“Arbitration Act”)[1] deals with the powers of courts to grant interim reliefs, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced, to parties in order to safeguard the subject matter
The Supreme Court of India (“SC”) in its landmark decision in Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE[1] (“Arif Azim”)[2] has once again reiterated the distinction between ‘seat’ and ‘venue’ in an arbitration agreement and its jurisdictional implication. The judgment addresses the contentious issue of whether a location designated in an arbitration agreement serves merely as ‘venue’ (a place where proceedings may occur) or as juridical ‘seat’ (which grants a court jurisdictional oversight). This distinction has immense implications, especially for cross-border commercial agreements, where different interpretations can lead to divergent legal outcomes.Continue Reading Decoding Supreme Court’s Landmark Decision on ‘Seat’ vs. ‘Venue’ in Arbitration
A recent decision rendered by the Madras High Court in S. Srinivasan v. The Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Chennai[1], has held that being in possession of the proceeds of crime and claiming it to be untainted property can independently be perceived as money laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”).
Although the said decision is in line with the principles previously enunciated by various courts while interpreting the PMLA provisions, such a simple interpretation may possibly lead to unintended situations. The primary reason being that anyone who is merely in possession of proceeds of crime without any genuine knowledge or any involvement therein can be prosecuted under PMLA. This perspective may prove to be counterproductive to the principle of presumption of innocence in criminal law.Continue Reading Is mere possession of proceeds of crime sufficient for trigerring PMLA?
The legal landscape governing insolvency resolution in India has undergone significant transformation since the advent of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”). One of the contentious issues in this evolving framework is whether simultaneous insolvency proceedings can be initiated against both the corporate debtor and its corporate guarantor for the same debt. The recent Supreme Court judgment in BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. (2024 INSC 548) offers clarity on the treatment of such proceedings and reinforces key principles governing the relationship between creditors, debtors, and guarantors.Continue Reading Simultaneous IBC Proceedings against Corporate Debtor and Corporate Guarantor: Critical Takeaways from BRS Ventures Case
Introduction of Section 29A to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”), by way of an amendment in 2015, marked a significant event in the arbitration regime in India. It recognised the sluggishness that had crept into arbitration proceedings and provided for strict timelines for making of an award. The section was further amended in 2019, pursuant to recommendations of Justice B N Srikrishna committee.Continue Reading Can an Arbitral Tribunal’s Mandate be Extended Post Award?
[Continued from Part I]
In 2019, aiming to solve the conundrum and marking a significant milestone in Indian arbitration, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Vidya Drolia and Ors v. Durga Trading Corporation,[1] (“Vidya Drolia”) laid down the contours of arbitrability. While analysing thearbitrability of Landlord-Tenant disputes governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TPA”), the Supreme Court elucidated that the mere existence of a special statute dealing with certain disputes does not ipso facto render them non-arbitrable, thereby widening the scope of arbitrability and increasing the access to arbitration in complex legal contexts. Continue Reading Arbitrability of Disputes: Indian Jurisprudence (Part 2)
![Arbitrability of Disputes: Indian Jurisprudence [Part I]](https://disputeresolution.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/894/2024/06/Blog-Image43-656x375.png)
Arbitrability plays a pivotal role in dispute resolution, determining if a particular dispute can be resolved through arbitration. Several key factors, including, among other things, procedural/curial laws, governing law and actual text of the arbitral agreements, identity of the parties, etc., help establish arbitrability.[1] Continue Reading Arbitrability of Disputes: Indian Jurisprudence [Part I]
In Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement Jalandhar Zonal Office,[1] the bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan of the Supreme Court (“SC”) held on (i) the Enforcement Directorate’s (“ED”) powers of arrest under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002[2] (“PMLA”), once cognizance is taken of a PMLA complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA,[3] and (ii) the applicability of the twin conditions of bail under Section 45 of the PMLA[4] in instances where the accused has furnished a bond in accordance with Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[5] (“CrPC”), for appearance in court following summons. In this significant decision, the SC essentially addresses the extent of the ED’s powers of arrest and applicability of the stringent twin conditions of bail under Section 45 of the PMLA once the Special Court has taken cognizance of a complaint under Section 44 of the PMLA.Continue Reading ED cannot arrest accused once cognizance is taken by the Special Court under PMLA: Supreme Court
The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its recent judgment in Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar & Anr.[1] adjudicated inter alia upon repugnancy in clauses when construing/ interpreting a deed or a contract. It was categorically held that where the earlier and later clause of a deed cannot be reconciled, the earlier clause would prevail over the later clause in accordance with themaxim of ut res magis valeat quam pereat[2].Continue Reading Earlier clause prevails over subsequent clause in case of repugnancy: Supreme Court