Photo of Pravar Misra

Pravar Misra

Principal Associate in the Dispute Resolution practice at the Noida office of Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas. Pravar specializes in matters in the realm of arbitration, insolvency, white collar and other corporate and commercial litigation, and advises a wide range of domestic and international clients. He can be reached at pravar.misra@cyrilshroff.com

 

Should cognizance be taken before or after examination of complainant on oath? Delhi High Court refers matter to larger bench

Summary: A magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a private complaint prior to examining the complainant on oath under Section 200 of the CrPC, 1973. However, BNSS, 2023, has upset this settled position. Like the erstwhile Section 200 of the CrpC, Section 223 of the BNSS too confers a similar duty on the magistrate to examine the complainant on oath. But the newly-introduced proviso to Section 223(1) (absent under Section 200 CrPC) mandates that the accused must be heard prior to the magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. This is the point at which divergence arises, raising the issue of whether cognizance is taken before or after the examination of the complainant? High Courts in India, including the Delhi High Court, have interpreted Section 223(1) of the BNSS to imply that the magistrate must firstexamine the complainant on oath, then issue notice to the accused, and only take cognizance at the time of hearing the accused. However, several Supreme Court judgements have held cognizance as already been taken if the magistrate proceeds to examine the complainant on oath. The Delhi High Court took note of this variance in its judgement in Dr Rita Bakshi v. Seema Bajaj and has further referred the issue for consideration by a larger bench.

Continue Reading Should cognizance be taken before or after examination of complainant on oath? Delhi High Court refers matter to larger bench

Summary: A common misconception is that arbitral tribunals must decide every jurisdictional challenge under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, at the threshold before proceeding with the arbitration. This article explains why neither Section 16 nor the judicial precedents interpreting it mandate such a requirement and highlights the tribunal’s discretion to decide judicial issues when appropriate. Many jurisdictional challenges involve disputed facts or evidence, making an early determination impractical. Understanding this helps parties manage procedural expectations and avoid misplaced comparisons with Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

Continue Reading Raise the Objection, Not the Expectation: Arbitral Tribunal need not decide Section 16 application first
Miss the Deadline, Lose the Decree? SC clarifies effect of non-compliance and applicability of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act

Summary: In its recent judgement dated May 6, 2026 in Habban Shah v. Sheruddin, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that decrees for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property are conditional and self-operative. The plaintiff’s failure to comply with timelines for deposit of balance sale consideration, without seeking extension, can render the decree inexecutable automatically. This consequence may follow even without a formal application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, by the defendant. The rationale being, the relief of specific performance is equitable and the party that seeks equity, cannot act inequitably by not adhering to the terms of the decree.

Continue Reading Miss the Deadline, Lose the Decree? SC clarifies effect of non-compliance and applicability of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act
Findings of a Civil Court binding on Criminal Court? SC clears the air

Summary: A persistent misconception in legal discourse is that findings or determinations of a civil court are binding on a criminal court, despite no such rule being codified in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, or its successor statute, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. This belief often leads to the argument that a civil judgment should conclusively govern subsequent criminal proceedings. However, this position does not reflect the true legal framework. The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon & Anr., tracing the evolution of law on this point, provides much-needed clarity, reaffirming the distinct nature, standards of proof, and purposes of civil and criminal proceedings, and explaining the limited evidentiary value, rather than absolute binding effect, of civil court findings in criminal trials.

Continue Reading Findings of a Civil Court binding on Criminal Court? SC clears the air
Liberty Ends Where Fraud Begins: Supreme Court Signals Recalibration of Standards for Bail for Habitual Economic Offenders

Summary: Bail is the rule, jail is the exception, is an axiom. A tight rope between individual liberty and public interest, bail jurisprudence in India has evolved to err on the side of liberty. However, heinous offences are a slight exception to this rule and bail is often denied in such matters, considering the nature of the offence and larger societal interest.  The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in Rakesh Mittal v Ajay Pal Gupta and Anr., marks an interesting development in this exception to ordinary bail jurisprudence. Applying precedents dealing with bail in heinous offence matters, the Court held that the same principles would also apply to grave pecuniary offences, especially when committed by habitual offenders. Accordingly, overturning an order of bail granted by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court on the ground of parity with other accused, the Court also considered factors such as criminal antecedents of the accused, including a long history of fraud, absconding, and misuse of bail in other matters. Whether this is a unique exception or signals a change in jurisprudence remains to be seen.

Continue Reading Liberty Ends Where Fraud Begins: Supreme Court Signals Recalibration of Standards for Bail for Habitual Economic Offenders
BNSS and the pre-cognizance imperative: Procedural safeguard u/s 223 applies even to PMLA Complaints

Summary: The proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, 2023, stipulates that a Magistrate shall not take cognizance of an offence without first affording the accused an opportunity to be heard. By its judgement in Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement[1] (“Kushal Kumar”),the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified that this safeguard under the BNSS shall also apply to complaints filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”), after July 1, 2024, viz. the date BNSS came into force. The ratio from Kushal Kumar has since been followed inter alia by the High Courts of Delhi and Kerala. These judgements reinforce a significant procedural safeguard for accused persons even under the stringent PMLA, while highlighting a marked departure from the regime under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). An associated issue is whether cognizance on a supplementary complaint under the PMLA, filed after July 1, 2024, will also be bound by the safeguard of Section 223(1) of the BNSS, if cognizance on the main complaint was taken prior to July 1, 2024.

Continue Reading BNSS and the pre-cognizance imperative: Procedural safeguard u/s 223 applies even to PMLA Complaints
Lawful Silence, Unlawful Assumptions: Bail, Confession, and Constitutional Rights

Summary: The police are legally obligated to conduct investigations and gather evidence through lawful means. Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, an accused person cannot be compelled to confess, as the right against self-incrimination is a protected fundamental right. Therefore, choosing not to make self-incriminating statements or confessions cannot be construed as “non-cooperation” during a police investigation. Such refusal, being constitutionally valid, cannot be used by the police as grounds to oppose bail or anticipatory bail applications.

Continue Reading Lawful Silence, Unlawful Assumptions: Bail, Confession, and Constitutional Rights
Alternate remedy no bar to High Courts exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC: Supreme Court

Summary: Commonly (mis)understood to be only a power of quashing, Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) is much broader in ambit. The Section recognises the inherent jurisdiction High Courts in India have in dealing with criminal matters, including the power to prevent abuse of process of “any court” or pass orders to “secure the ends of justice”.

Continue Reading Alternate remedy no bar to High Courts exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC: Supreme Court
Nascent stage of investigation no bar for quashing: Supreme Court clarifies High Court’s power under Section 528 BNSS

Summary: The power to quash a criminal matter under Section 528 BNSS, 2023 (erstwhile Section 482, CrPC, 1973), is well settled. It is a power to be exercised sparingly, within well accepted parameters, including no offence being disclosed, malice, abuse of criminal process, etc. If such relevant factors otherwise stand fulfilled, there is no bar to quashing an FIR, even if the investigation is at a preliminary/ nascent stage.

Continue Reading Nascent stage of investigation no bar for quashing: Supreme Court clarifies High Court’s power under Section 528 BNSS
Beyond the Signature: Who Gets a Seat at the Arbitration Table?

Summary: This blog clarifies the prior steps that must be taken before approaching a magistrate with an application under Section 156(3) CrPC- with reference to a recent judgement of the Supreme Court in Anurag Bhatnagar. We explain how the judgement in Anurag Bhatnagar ought not to be taken as a blanket exemption from the pursuing the prior steps.

Continue Reading Steps under Section 154 CrPC no longer mandatory? Judgment in Anurag Bhatnagar-unique outlier or shift in jurisprudence?