Summary: Bail is the rule, jail is the exception, is an axiom. A tight rope between individual liberty and public interest, bail jurisprudence in India has evolved to err on the side of liberty. However, heinous offences are a slight exception to this rule and bail is often denied in such matters, considering the nature of the offence and larger societal interest. The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in Rakesh Mittal v Ajay Pal Gupta and Anr., marks an interesting development in this exception to ordinary bail jurisprudence. Applying precedents dealing with bail in heinous offence matters, the Court held that the same principles would also apply to grave pecuniary offences, especially when committed by habitual offenders. Accordingly, overturning an order of bail granted by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court on the ground of parity with other accused, the Court also considered factors such as criminal antecedents of the accused, including a long history of fraud, absconding, and misuse of bail in other matters. Whether this is a unique exception or signals a change in jurisprudence remains to be seen.
Introduction
The right to liberty is sacrosanct. As is maintenance of public peace, law, and order. Even though presumed innocent, the accused’s liberty may nonetheless be deprived to protect larger societal interests. Bail, therefore, remains one of the most debated aspects of criminal law. While on the one hand, it protects the fundamental right to liberty, on the other, the denial of bail (in appropriate cases) ensures that accused persons do not misuse freedom to repeat crimes or obstruct justice.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta (“Rakesh Mittal”)[1]is a striking example of this balancing act. At the heart of the case was a businessman who claimed he was cheated of crores of rupees in a foodgrain deal. The accused, Ajay Pal Gupta, had allegedly used multiple fake identities and forged documents to perpetrate the fraud. While the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court granted him bail, the Supreme Court intervened and set aside the order, holding that liberty could not be a shield for habitual economic offenders.
Background
The Appellant, Rakesh Mittal, supplied foodgrains worth over INR 11.5 crore but received only (approx.) INR 5 crore in payments. Even the cheques issued for the balance were dishonoured. Investigations revealed that the accused, Ajay Pal Gupta, had fabricated Aadhaar and PAN cards, assumed different identities, and even changed his father’s name on documents to avoid detection. He had remained absconding for nearly 20 months before his arrest in August 2025.
The Sessions Court denied bail, citing his criminal history. However, the Hon’ble High Court later granted bail inter alia on grounds of parity with his co-accused. This order was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Supreme Court’s Judgment
The Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the Hon’ble High Court’s order granting bail. In doing so, it examined the reasoning adopted by the High Court and also considered key principles to be factored in while determining whether to grant bail.
First, the Court held that the parity principle (grant of bail on “parity” with other co-accused), cannot be applied automatically. Merely because the other co-accused were granted bail, would not ipso facto entitle Mr. Gupta to bail as well. The court noted that Mr. Gupta’s case was different, because of his repeated frauds and misuse of bail in earlier cases, holding “The High Court ought not to have blindly extended the parity principle to him without considering the distinctive features of his case.”
Next, the Supreme Court noted that the High Court had erred in assuming that the nature of offences was such that the matter was triable by a Magistrate and clarified that the offences included criminal breach of trust (Section 409 IPC) and forgery (Section 467 IPC), which carry punishments up to life imprisonment. Thus, it was always open to the magistrate to commit the matter to trial before the Sessions Court (under Sections 209/323 CrPC). Therefore, the underlying assumption about the gravity of the offence was premature.
Most significantly, the Supreme Court observed that since economic offences can be as harmful to society as violent crimes, the factors considered while granting bail in “heinous offences” must also be applied to economic offences as well, particularly those involving repeat offenders.
To draw this analogy, the Court referred to its previous judgments in Neeru Yadav v. State of UP[2] and Sudha Singh v. State of UP,[3] where the order granting bail in matters of heinous offences was set aside.
In Neeru Yadav, the Supreme Court cancelled bail granted on the principle of parity because of the accused’s antecedents as a history sheeter, including in several violent offences.
In Sudha Singh, the Court set aside an order of bail granted to an alleged contract killer who posed a threat to the complainant and witnesses. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the strict parameters within which bail ought to be granted or rejected, which are:
“(i) Whether there was a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of accusations;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of a conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if granted bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of repetition of the offence;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and
(viii) danger of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”
After citing past precedents, the Court, in Rakesh Mittal, applied these principles to the matter in question and held: “Though the observations made in some of the above cases were in the context of heinous offences, which is not the case presently, we may note that the value of life and liberty of members of society is not limited only to their ‘person’ but would also extend to the quality of their life, including their economic well-being. In offences of a pecuniary nature, where innocent people are cheated of their hard-earned monies by conmen, who make it their life’s pursuit to exploit and feast upon the gullibility of others, the aforestated factors must necessarily be weighed while dealing with the alleged offenders’ pleas for grant of bail.”
The order granting bail was thus set aside.
Looking Ahead
The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Rakesh Mittal should not be viewed merely as an exercise in setting aside an order granting bail. Rather, it marks a slight recalibration in approach to bail in cases involving economic offences. The judgment underscores that while liberty is indeed fundamental, it cannot protect those who repeatedly cheat society. The decision perhaps also expands the scope of “heinous offences” from merely physical/violent acts to include economic offences, which have a similarly devastating effect.
By setting aside the High Court’s order, the Supreme Court reinforced the principle that bail must be granted with caution, keeping in mind the unique facts of each case.
Whether the judgment is a unique outlier or an expansion on the rich bail jurisprudence remains to be seen. The true impact of this ruling will emerge in how consistently courts choose to apply this calibrated approach, paving the way for a more cautious and context-sensitive framework for bail in economic offences.
[1] SLP (Crl.) No. 19708/2025
[2] AIR 2015 SC 3703
[3] AIR 2021 SC 2149