Arbitration

Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, Does Not Envisage Making of a Separate Application If Due Objection is Made Before the Court to its Jurisdiction

The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Madhu Sudan Sharma & Ors. v. Omaxe Ltd.[1]recently held that once a party has taken objection in its written statement to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit due to the presence of the arbitration clause between the parties, it would amount to sufficient compliance of Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”). The Court also held that once a party extracts an arbitration clause in its written submission to object to the jurisdiction of the Court, a separate application under Section 8 of the Act would not be necessary.Continue Reading Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, Does Not Envisage Making of a Separate Application If Due Objection is Made Before the Court to its Jurisdiction

Extension of Mandate of Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: A Primer for Practitioners

INTRODUCTION

Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”), inserted vide theAmending Act of 2015 (w.e.f. 23.10.2015), was meant to introduce time limit for completion of arbitration proceedings. It prescribed a statutory period of 12 (twelve) months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon reference. Thereafter, vide the Amending Act of 2019 (w.e.f. 30.08.2019), the prescribed time limit was modified, and the Act required arbitration proceedings to be completed within 12 (twelve) months from the date of completion of pleadings. Further, sub-section (3) of Section 29A of the Act allows an extension of 6 (six) months by mutual consent of the parties for passing the award. Similarly, sub-section (4) of Section 29A of the Act provides that in the event the award is not passed in terms of Section 29A(1) or within the extended period of Section 29A(3), the parties can make an application to the court for extension of mandate of the arbitral tribunal.Continue Reading Extension of Mandate of Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: A Primer for Practitioners

SC rules on applicability of doctrine of ‘group of companies’ in arbitration jurisprudence

Introduction

Consent by way of consensus-ad-idem and party autonomy are so deeply entrenched as the foundational or grundnorm principles of arbitration, that any material deviation therefrom is likely to pose challenges. One such challenge is the introduction of the doctrine of ‘group of companies’ in the jurisprudence of Indian arbitration, whereunder an arbitration agreement is extended, under certain conditions, to even non-signatory companies of the same group. In the words of Dr. Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Hon’ble CJI, it is “a modern theory which challenges the conventional notions of arbitration law.”Continue Reading SC rules on applicability of doctrine of ‘group of companies’ in arbitration jurisprudence

Devas v Antrix: fraud as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award: unique outlier or a sign of things to come?

INTRODUCTION

‘Fraud vitiates all’ is a legal principle firmly embedded in the Indian jurisprudence. An iteration of this principle also finds place in the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”), in Section 34(2)(b)(ii), whereunder an arbitral award can be challenged for being in ‘conflict with public policy of Indian Law’, inter alia if “the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud”.Continue Reading Devas v Antrix: fraud as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award: unique outlier or a sign of things to come?

CONUNDRUM SURROUNDING SECTION 42 OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996

INTRODUCTION

India’s arbitration law is thorough and organic because of its ever-evolving nature, through several amendments and decisions of the courts from time to time. However, the strict wordings of certain provisions contained in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”),have caused a stir, for which courts have had to step in and use the tools of interpretation to resolve such practical dilemmas. Continue Reading Conundrum Surrounding Section 42 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Arbitral clause contemplating ambiguous pre-deposit condition is violative of Article 14: Supreme Court holds in a Section 11(6) application

Introduction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, vide its recent judgment in Lombardi Engineering Ltd. v. State of Uttarakhand[1] adjudicated inter alia upon whether, when deciding an application under Section 11(6) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996[2] (“1996 Act”), for appointment of a sole arbitrator, the validity of a pre-deposit condition can be looked into on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India?Continue Reading Arbitral clause contemplating ambiguous pre-deposit condition is violative of Article 14: Supreme Court holds in a Section 11(6) application

Extension under Section 29A of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 not a possibility if application for extension is not made while mandate subsisted

The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd v Berger Paints India Limited 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 2645 recently deliberated on the issue of whether Courts can extend an arbitral tribunal’s mandate under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”), after the mandate of the arbitral tribunal has been terminated.Continue Reading Extension under Section 29A of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 not a possibility if application for extension is not made while mandate subsisted

CAN A CHALLENGE TO AN ARBITRAL AWARD BE DISMISSED FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS FOR STAY ON ENFORCEMENT?

An arbitral award can be challenged by filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”). Ordinarily, along with the application to set aside an arbitral award, another application is filed under Section 36(2) of the Act seeking a stay on the operation of the award. Prior to the amendment to the Act in the year 2015, mere filing of an application under Section 34 of the Act would lead to an automatic stay on the enforcement of the award. However, pursuant to the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, Section 36(2) was amended to state that filing of an application to set aside an arbitral award shall not by itself render the award unenforceable and a specific order of stay of operation of the award shall have to be granted on a separate application being made for that purpose. Upon the filing of a separate application, seeking a stay on the operation of the arbitral award, the court may grant the stay, while imposing certain conditions, as it may deem fit. These conditions could entail either furnishing a bank guarantee or depositing cash with the court, to secure the arbitral award. The form and quantum of the security depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and is typically driven by the financial wherewithal and the conduct of the judgment debtor.Continue Reading Can a Challenge to an Arbitral Award be Dismissed for Non-Compliance with Conditions for Stay on Enforcement?

The Bombay High Court was recently called upon to decide an application filed by Anupam Mittal (“Applicant”), the founder of shaadi.com, seeking to restrain Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings and other directors of People Interactive (India) Private Limited (“Respondents”) from enforcing an anti-suit injunction granted by the High Court of Singapore. The anti-suit injunction restrained the Applicant from proceeding with his oppression and mismanagement petition before the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) on the ground that parties had agreed to resolve their disputes via arbitration seated in Singapore and disputes pertaining to oppression and mismanagement were arbitrable under Singapore law.Continue Reading Party Autonomy Restrained? Dissecting Bombay High Court’s Anti-Enforcement Injunction Order in Anupam Mittal v. People Interactive (India) Pvt. Ltd.

Introduction

Dissolution of a Partnership under The Indian Partnership Act, 1932, “Partnership Act” can have far-reaching consequences, affecting not only the erstwhile partners but also related third parties. The process of dissolution involves activities such as settling of accounts, concluding of on-going business matters, discharging the Partnership firm’s liabilities and finally, distributing any remaining assets among the partners basis their respective shares. The Limitation Act, 1963 provides a period of three years from the date of dissolution within which  the parties can agitate their claims arising from the dissolution and winding up of the firm[1]. The period of limitation rests on the notion that the date of dissolution marks the conclusion of the firm’s winding-up process and settling of the rights and liabilities of the affected parties. However, is dissolution synonymous with winding up of the firm? Can erstwhile partners not have a right to agitate their claims post the period of three years if the process of winding-up could not be completed within the timeframe? Pertinently, through this blog, we aim to analyse whether any claims surviving the period of three years, which have been left unadjudicated are deadwood or can be brought under the period of limitation and give rise to a continuing cause of action.Continue Reading Stopping the clock on claims arising from dissolution of partnership firms