Summary: The article examines the Indian Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, which confirms that courts retain the power under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to extend an arbitrator’s mandate even after an award has been passed following the expiry of that mandate. Crucially, the Court clarified that such a post-mandate award is unenforceable, and any extension of the mandate does not validate the defective award. Instead, the tribunal may resume proceedings from the point at which the mandate expired and deliver a fresh, valid award within the extended period. The judgment clarifies that an award delivered after the expiry of mandate of the tribunal is not fatal to the arbitration itself, and procedural steps may be taken to revive and resume the arbitration so that a valid award may be delivered to bring the arbitration to conclusion.

Arbitration’s defining promise is finality – swift, binding resolution without the delays that plague conventional litigation. Yet, in practice, arbitrations routinely run past their statutory deadlines. In a significant reaffirmation of India’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of India, in C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera,[1]has clarified that the expiry of a tribunal’s mandate, or even the passing of an award after that expiry, does not extinguish the court’s power under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”), to extend the mandate and rescue the arbitration.

Brief Background

The controversy before the Supreme Court arose from a challenge to an arbitral award that had been issued after the tribunal’s mandate under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act had expired. Although the arbitral proceedings had substantially concluded and the delay occurred partly because of settlement discussions between the parties, the award was ultimately delivered three months after the tribunal’s mandate had lapsed. The Respondent challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act on the grounds that it was passed after the arbitrator’s mandate had expired and, consequently, the arbitral proceedings stood terminated before the award was passed. In contrast, the Appellant filed an application for extension under Section 29A (5) of the Arbitration Act before the Madras High Court six months after the expiry of the mandate.

The Madras High Court held that an application for extension of mandate under Section 29A(5) was not maintainable if filed after the award had been rendered and ruled that an award passed after the expiry of the mandate was a nullity and non-enforceable. It refused to extend the precedent laid down in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd.,which had permitted applications for post-expiry extension, to the present case, i.e., a situation where an award had already been rendered.

The Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court entirely reversed the Madras High Court’s judgment. On the maintainability of a 29A application filed after the passing of an award, the Supreme Court traced the origin of Section 29A to the Arbitration Act, which was introduced through the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, to address rising delays in passing an award. After reviewing the scheme of the provision, the Supreme Court concluded that there is no bar on filing an application for extension of the mandate of an arbitrator even when an award had been delivered after expiry of the mandate. It observed that the Parliament never intended for an arbitrator’s act of delivering an award after expiry of the mandate to denude the power and jurisdiction vested in the Court under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court also clarified the phrase “if an award is not made” in Section 29A(4) only governs the court’s power to extend an arbitrator’s mandate before or after expiry. It does not address, let alone bar, a situation where an award is rendered after the mandate lapses. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the court’s power and jurisdiction in passing an award without mandate is independent of and uninfluenced by the act of the arbitrator.

The Supreme Court also clarified that an award passed after expiry of the tribunal’s mandate is not a “nullity”. Instead, it is unenforceable under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act and does not attain the status of a decree. Thus, such an award need not be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In practice, this implies that any challenge on procedural grounds can only be raised upon the filing of an application seeking a retrospective extension of the tribunal’s mandate under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act.

The Supreme Court also unequivocally clarified that an extension granted post expiry of the tribunal’s mandate does not revive the award already passed and that it remains unenforceable. Consequently, the mandate extension allows the arbitral tribunal to resume proceedings seamlessly from the point at which the mandate expired and deliver a fresh, valid award within the extended period. In effect, the post-award extension rescues the arbitration and not the award itself. It is not a backdoor route to curing a defective award. Instead, it is only a mechanism to give the arbitration a proper second chance and not frustrate the proceedings altogether on technical grounds.

The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that permitting post-award extension would encourage indiscipline among arbitrators or parties, emphasising that extension under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act is neither automatic nor routine and will not be granted as a matter of course. It held that a court must be satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the extension sought. Section 29A of the Arbitration Act equips courts with a calibrated toolkit that empowers the court to reduce arbitral fees, impose costs, substitute arbitrators, and fix strict future timelines, thereby ensuring that arbitrators are held accountable without dismantling the arbitral process altogether.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Supreme Court is a welcome clarification for parties navigating the regime under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act. It limits the scope for technical challenges that could derail arbitral outcomes on the basis of procedural lapses relating to timelines. It delivers three clear practical benefits. First, an arbitration is not wiped out because of a procedural misstep, particularly when parties have substantially participated and incurred significant costs. Second, the remedy for a post-mandate award lies in an application under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, not a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, which is a less burdensome route for the parties. Third, and most importantly, a post-award extension does not validate the defective award in as much as that proceedings restart from the point of expiry of the mandate and a fresh, valid award must be delivered within the time granted by the court.

The Supreme Court reinforced the role of courts as facilitators of dispute resolution, emphasising that arbitration law must remain accessible, expeditious, and cohesive, with procedural discipline serving the larger objective of dispute resolution rather than undermining it.

[1] (2026 INSC 112)