Summary: The Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule resolved conflicting High Court views on whether Section 29A application to extend an arbitral tribunal’s mandate lies before the High Court or the Civil Court. Drawing a clear and principled distinction between appointment jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction, it held that jurisdiction under Section 29A rests exclusively with the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e), irrespective of whether the tribunal was appointed under Section 11(2) or 11(6). Rejecting a hierarchy‑based reasoning, the judgment affirms statutory text as the sole determinant of jurisdiction, thereby bringing clarity and consistency to Indian arbitration jurisprudence. The Court invoked Dicey’s enduring dictum: “however high you may be, the law is above you.”
Introduction
The Supreme Court’s decision in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule[1] resolves a critical jurisdictional question that had long divided High Courts into two irreconcilable streams of authority — should an application for extension of time under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996[2] (“Act”), be filed before the High Court which appointed the arbitrator or, the Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The judgment represents a decisive rejection of interpretive approaches grounded in notions of court hierarchy and affirms the primacy of statutory text in determining jurisdiction.
Background
The Single Judge of the Bombay High Court at Goa referred two domestic arbitration questions to the Division Bench. First, if an arbitral tribunal constituted by the High Court under Section 11(6) fails to complete proceedings within the stipulated/ extended period, should an application under Section 29A(4) be filed in the High Court or the Civil Court original jurisdiction? Second, if an arbitral tribunal constituted under Section 11(2), based on the agreement and consent of the parties, fails to complete proceedings within the stipulated/ extended period, should such an application be submitted to the High Court or the Civil Court having original jurisdiction.
The Division Bench answered that if the High Court has constituted an arbitral tribunal under Section 11(6), the application under Section 29A(4) needs to be made to the High Court, but if it is constituted under Section 11(2), as per agreement and consent of the parties, the application would lie to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, including the High Court, in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction.[3]
Divergent High Court Approaches
Before delving into the question, the Supreme Court identified two distinct streams of High Court jurisprudence on this issue:
Plain Reading of Section 2(1)(e)
The first stream of High Court decisions[4] hold that the expression “Court” in Section 29A of the Act refers to the definition provided in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. This applies regardless of whether the arbitral tribunal was constituted by the Supreme Court or High Court under Section 11(6), or through mutual consent of parties as outlined under Section 11(2). The reasoning stems from the principle that once an arbitrator has been appointed through the judicial process, the appointing court becomes functus officio, and applications seeking extension of mandate must accordingly be filed before the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e).
Further, the text of the Act is unambiguous as, neither a High Court (not having original ordinary civil jurisdiction) has been included with regard to jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 29A, nor has a Principal Civil Court been excluded from Section 2(1)(e), as has been explicitly done for Sections 47 and 57 of the Act.
Contextual Interpretation Based on Hierarchical Concerns
The second stream of High Court decisions[5] hold that when an arbitrator is appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6), applications for extension of time under Section 29A cannot be made before Civil Courts, as this interpretation would create a jurisdictional anomaly where the High Court would be appointing the arbitrator and the Civil Court, a Court inferior to it, could be asked to extend the arbitrator’s mandate or appoint a substitute arbitrator.
To address this issue, the rulings interpret the term “Court” in Section 29A contextually. They rely on the opening phrase in Section 2(1) of the Act, “in this Part, unless the context otherwise requires”, to conclude that, to extend the mandate of an arbitral tribunal constituted under Section 11(6) by the High Court or the Supreme Court, the relevant “Court” is not the one defined in Section 2(1)(e), it is the High Court or the Supreme Court that constituted the tribunal under Section 11(6) of the Act.
The Analytical Framework adopted by the Supreme Court
The Court begins by disproving the need to bifurcate the question based on the initial process of appointment under Section 11(6) and Section 11(2) of the Act, respectively, holding that the true issue lies not in the mode of constitution of the tribunal but in identifying the proper forum empowered under Section 29A to extend its mandate.
The Court’s analysis underscores a functional compartmentalisation of the Act, treating it as a complete code with distinct chapters — covering general provisions (Chapter I), arbitration agreements (Chapter II), composition of the arbitral tribunal (Chapter III), jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals (Chapter IV), conduct of arbitral proceedings (Chapter V), making of award and termination (Chapter VI), and judicial remedies including challenge, appeal, finality, and enforcement (Chapters VII–IX), each serving distinct and separate purposes. The Court breaks down the Parliament’s intent behind introducing such chapters — to introduce efficiency, where appointment jurisdiction differs from supervisory jurisdiction. In particular, jurisdiction under Section 11 is special and limited, confined to a prima facie determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.[6] The same stands exhausted once the tribunal is constituted, leaving no residual supervisory power with such referral court, and thus necessitating approaching the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e) i.e., the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, for purposes of Section 29A.
The Supreme Court refers to Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C and C JV[7], affirming that the power under Section 29A(4) vests in the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e), being the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, including a High Court with ordinary original civil jurisdiction, and that the power of substitution under Section 29A(6) is a consequential power vesting in the same court.
The Supreme Court also relies on the reasoning in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.[8], to distinguish and explain why the Parliament vested the Section 11 power in the Chief Justice rather than in the “Court” as defined. The underlying intent is to ensure that the appointment of the arbitral tribunal carries the greatest credibility and is exercised by the highest judicial authority in the state and in the country.
Relying on A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak[9] and State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., [10] the Court’s analysis underscored that jurisdiction cannot be shaped by notions of hierarchy or conflict of power, which are opposed to the fundamental conception of rule of law, but must rest squarely on the statutory text. It rejected the argument that civil courts should be excluded from Section 29A applications merely because arbitrators are appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6).
Further, applying settled principles of statutory interpretation, the Court emphasised that defined terms must carry their assigned meaning unless context dictates otherwise.[11] Building on precedents,[12] the Court clarified that applications concerning termination or substitution must be filed before the “Court” so defined under Section 2(1)(e), not before the Supreme Court or High Court acting under Section 11(6).
The Court clarified that Section 42, which channels all subsequent applications to the same court where the first application under Part I of the Act was made, does not apply to proceedings under Section 11. Applications under Section 11 are made before the Chief Justice of the High Court or of India, or their designate, who do not qualify as a “Court” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e). Consequently, the filing of a Section 11 application does not trigger Section 42, and later applications such as those under Section 29A cannot be funnelled to the High Court on that basis.[13]
Holding of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court conclusively held that all applications under Section 29A(4) for extension of time must be filed before the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e), namely, the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The method of appointment of the arbitral tribunal, whether by the parties under Section 11(2) or by the High Court under Section 11(6), is immaterial to determining jurisdiction. Once the tribunal is constituted, the appointing authority under Section 11 becomes functus officio and retains no supervisory power over arbitral proceedings. The authority to extend time or substitute arbitrators under Section 29A(6) vests in the statutorily defined “Court” under Section 2(1)(e), and not in the High Court or Supreme Court acting in their Section 11(6) capacity.
Conclusion
In resolving a long‑standing jurisdictional divide, the Supreme Court’s ruling restores coherence to the scheme of the Act and reinforces the principle that legislative text, not judicial hierarchy, must guide jurisdiction. By delineating the boundaries of Section 11 and Section 29A, the judgment safeguards arbitral independence and enhances institutional clarity. It stands as a significant step toward harmonising arbitration practice across India.
[1] 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124
[2] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act No. 26 of 1996)
[3] Vide order dated 07.08.2024 in Writ Petition No. 88 of 2024 filed by Respondent No.1, against of order of the Commercial Court in CMA No. 20/2023/A allowing application under Section 29A by Respondent no. 2
[4] Mormugao Port Trust v. Ganesh Benzoplast Ltd. 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 11821; A’Xykno Capital Services Private Ltd. v. State of UP 2023 SCC OnLine ALL 2991; Dr. VV Subbarao v. Dr. Appa Rao Mukkamala 2024 SCC OnLine AP 1668
[5] Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel v. Bhanubhai Ramanbhai Patel 2018 SCC OnLine Guj 5017; Cabra Instalaciones Y. Servicios v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. 2019 SCC Online Bom 1437; DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co. 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2501; Amit Kumar Gupta v. Dipak Prasad 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 2174; Magnus Opus IT Consulting Pvt Ltd v. Artcad Systems 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 2861; Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative Limited v. Manish Engineering Enterprises 2022 SCC OnLine All 150; Best Eastern Business House Pvt. Ltd. v. Mina Pradhan 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 7997; Ovington Finance Pvt Ltd. v. Bindiya Naga 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8765; K.I.P.L. Vistacore Infra Projects J.V. v. Municipal Corporation of the city of Ichalkarnj 2024 SCC Online Bom 327; Geo Miller Company Private Limited v. UP Jal Nigam 2024 SCC OnLine All 1676;
[6] Duro Felguera SA v. Gangavaram Port Ltd (2017) 9 SCC 729; Interplay Between Arbitration Agreement under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 In re (2024) 6 SCC 1; SBI General Insurance Co Ltd v. Krish Spinning Mills Pvt. Ltd. 2024 SCC Online SC 1754
[7] Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C and C JV2024 SCC OnLine SC 1801
[8] SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618
[9] A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602
[10] State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 602
[11] KV Muthu v. Angamuthu Amman (1997) 2 SCC 53
[12] State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (2015) 1 SCC 32; Nimet Resources Inc. v. Essar Steels Ltd. (2009) 17 SCC 313
[13] State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. (2018) 2 SCC 602; State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (2015) 1 SCC 32