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When the internet won’t let you move on: Delhi High Court’s landmark ruling on the Right to Be Forgotten

Summary: What happens when everyone, but the internet has moved on? In a landmark judgment delivered on May 29, 2026, the Delhi High Court has addressed the growing problem of digital records that continue to haunt individuals, long after legal proceedings have concluded. Even after legal closure may be achieved through acquittal, discharge and settlement, a simple online search can still link a person with past allegations for years to come.

Recognising this reality, the Court held that while judicial records must remain accessible under the principle of open justice, individuals may, in appropriate cases, seek relief through de-indexing and masking of their personal information that may be made available online. These remedies protect privacy and dignity without erasing judicial history.

The judgment is one of the most significant Indian decisions on the ‘right to be forgotten’, as it acknowledges that in the digital age, legal exoneration does not always translate into reputational vindication.

Introduction:

In its landmark judgement dated May 29, 2026, the Delhi High Court recognised this increasingly common challenge of the digital age, and has once again reiterated and reinforced the ‘Right to be Forgotten’, as a facet of the fundamental right to privacy.

Parties before the Court

The Court was dealing with a batch of petitions arising from several different factual situations, including petitioners who had long been acquitted or discharged in criminal cases, had proceedings/ FIRs against them quashed, and even individuals whose names incidentally appeared in judicial records.

The Respondents broadly comprised the following classes/ categories:

  • Union of India – Through the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (“Ministry”), and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting;
  • Digital Intermediaries
  • Search engines: Google, Microsoft, etc., which inter alia provide search engine functions;
  • Social Media intermediaries: X Corp. (formerly Twitter); and
  • Indiankanoon – An online repository of judicial decisions.
  • Media houses: Being the original publishers of the content.

Maintainability:

As is customary in petitions of such nature, the digital intermediaries and media houses raised the question of maintainability as a preliminary issue, arguing that such writ petitions against private individuals were not maintainable.

Overruling such objection, the Court relying on Kaushal Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh[1], held that it could issue directions to the respondents therein, including private parties, since fundamental rights are enforceable even against persons other than the State/ its instrumentalities.

Further, in the context of the right to privacy, the Court found that a violation of informational privacy by private commercial entities operating at such extensive scale, was real, and was as constitutionally significant as any violation by a State actor. In the Court’s own words, “To hold otherwise would be to render the fundamental right to privacy illusory”.

The Legal Question: Privacy vs. Right to Information/ Open Justice

Crucially, the Court was called upon to strike a difficult balance between the public’s right to know, versus an individual’s right to privacy and dignity.

The Court reiterated that privacy is constitutionally protected under Article 21, but is not absolute. However, any restriction thereto must be legal, serve a legitimate goal, and be proportional.

In this conspectus, the Court held that the ‘right to be forgotten’, namely the ability to have personal information removed from public digital access, when no longer relevant, flows from this right to privacy. Drawing from K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, the Court observed that while human memory fades, the internet often does not and that the consequences of online information often outlast the legal proceedings themselves.

Concurrently, the Court made it clear that the right to be forgotten is not a right to erase history. Judicial records must be accessible for legitimate public purposes. The real issue was whether a person’s name should remain a permanent search-key, to allegations and proceedings that were resolved long ago.

Relief granted by the Delhi High Court and further directions

The Court expressly rejected Google’s argument that it merely acts as a neutral intermediary and observed that search engines do much more than simply display information.

To address the concerns, the Court granted two principal remedies across the batch of petitions: (i) de-indexing (or de-linking), which removes certain links from name-based search results while preserving the underlying records; and (ii) masking, which replaces names in publicly accessible versions of judgements with anonymised identifiers, while retaining the unredacted records for official purposes.

Recognising the impact that name-based searches can have on an individual’s reputation, privacy and future opportunities, the Court granted practical reliefs of de-indexing across the batch of petitions, where appropriate. Further, for categories including acquittals, discharges, quashed proceedings, settlements, private disputes, and people named by coincidence, the Court directed the search engines to de-index such name-based results globally, and not just within India.

Search engines such as Google were resultantly directed to de-index the relevant content, orders, judgements and associated reportage from name-based search results, such compliance to be in the same manner as a direction under Rule 3(1)(d) of the Intermediary Rules. Further, the Ministry was directed to ensure compliance with the above directions.

When will Courts grant such relief?

The Court made it clear that the right to be forgotten is not a blanket right, and that each case must be assessed on its own facts. Relevant considerations include (i) the nature of the information; (ii) time that has elapsed; (iii) accuracy of the information; (iv) continuing relevance of the information; (v) impact on an individual’s dignity and privacy; and (vi) the extent to which search engines amplify its visibility.

The Court noted that the above considerations must not be treated as mere checklists while granting reliefs. It must be weighed with due regard to the facts of each case. Further, the court cautioned that public accountability and public interest may, in certain cases, outweigh an individual’s privacy interests.

Before parting, the Court sounded a word of caution, flagging cases where it believed that relief in the form of de-indexing or masking may not be apposite. These include cases involving conviction for offences against women or children, and cases involving persons convicted of offences involving breach of public trust, including offences by public servants, elected representatives, and those in positions of fiduciary responsibility. The rationale being that in such cases, there exists an element of continuing public interest, inter alia, for protecting potential victims and those responsible for their safety, as also, the principle of public accountability, which demands that the public retain access to information about the abuse of public trust.

Conclusion and Practical Considerations

The Delhi High Court’s judgement recognises a simple but important reality: while judicial records may remain public, individuals should not indefinitely be defined by allegations and proceedings that have long since been resolved. By endorsing remedies such as de-indexing and masking, the Court has sought to balance open justice with privacy and dignity, ensuring that legal closure is not undermined by a permanent digital footprint.

Without rewriting history or restricting legitimate access to judicial records, the Court has thus provided a practical framework that allows individuals to move forward without being perpetually judged by allegations and proceedings that no longer reflect their legal status.

Notably, the significance of the Delhi High Court’s judgement extends beyond privacy law. For professionals who are subject to ‘fit and proper’ assessments in India’s financial sector, the decision arrives at a time when regulators are increasingly emphasising fairness, proportionality and due process.

This is illustrated in the Security and Exchange Board of India’s approval of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Intermediaries) (Amendment) Regulations, 2026, which inter alia removes the automatic disqualification triggers under Clauses 3(b)(i) and 3(b)(ii) of Schedule II to the SEBI (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008, which previously treated the pendency of certain criminal complaints, FIRs and charge sheets as grounds for disqualification, and introduced Clause 3B, requiring that no person be declared not ‘fit and proper’, without being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

Together, the Delhi High Court’s judgement and SEBI’s recent amendments reflect a broader shift towards fairness, due process and proportionality, ensuring that individuals are assessed basis established wrongdoings rather than mere allegations. Accordingly, the right to be forgotten assumes particular significance in ensuring that outdated allegations do not continue to shape an individual’s reputation, their professional and business opportunities.


[1] 2023 (4) SCC 1; See also: Dejo Kappan v. Deccan Herald & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6494