Summary: In Krishna Devi v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that the limitation period to challenge an arbitral award begins when a party becomes aware of the award — not when formal notice is received. This ruling curbs delaying tactics and prioritises substance over procedure. Though rooted in the 1940 Act, it signals a shift in interpreting timelines under the 1996 regime, urging parties to act on knowledge, not wait for paperwork.

What if the ticking clock on your legal rights starts not with a formal letter, but with a whisper of awareness? In Krishna Devi v. Union of India[1], the Supreme Court delivered a game-changing interpretation of limitation in arbitration law. By ruling that the clock starts from the moment a party knows about the award — not when they receive formal notice — the Court has nudged Indian arbitration closer to a pragmatic, efficiency-driven future. This decision, though rooted in the 1940 Act, sends ripples through the framework of the 1996 Act, challenging lawyers and litigants alike to rethink timelines.

Brief Factual Background

The Appellant secured a work order from the Union of India to build a permanent armament section at Tezpur, under the general conditions of contract. Dispute over pending bill payments arose between the parties and was referred to arbitration as per the general conditions of contract. The proceedings were concluded, and an award was passed favouring the Appellant on May 31, 2022.

However, the award could not be published on account of uncleared dues by the Respondent towards the arbitrator’s fees. The Appellant approached the District Judge, Sonitpur, who passed an order on September 21, 2022, directing the Respondents to clear the arbitrator’s fee. The Respondent received the award on September 22, 2022, but made payment towards the arbitrator’s fee only on November 18, 2022. Meanwhile, the Appellant had filed an application under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940 (“1940 Act”), for execution and pronouncement of judgement as per the arbitral award. This application was dismissed by the District Court on the ground that the application was premature since the limitation period began only on November 18, 2022, when the Respondent received the formal notice of the award after payment of dues, and the application could, therefore, only be filed after 30 days. The appellant filed a revision petition against such dismissal before the Gauhati High Court, which upheld the District Court’s order. The High Court’s order was then challenged before the Supreme Court.

Findings of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held that the Appellant had filed the application for pronouncement and execution after the expiry of the limitation period for raising objections to the award and hence its application was maintainable. In this regard, the court delved into the meaning of and intent behind service of notice under Section 14(2) of the 1940 Act and Section 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”), for calculation of limitation period.

Under Section 119(b) of the Limitation Act, service of notice of the making of the award is required for the limitation period to commence. Under Section 14(2) of the 1940 Act, upon filing of the award, the court shall give notice to the parties regarding filing of the award. The Supreme Court interpreted the words ‘to give notice’ to mean that the parties are aware about the existence of the award for any objections to be filed.

The Supreme Court relied on Food Corporation of India v. E. Kuttappan[2], and Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunaq, Co. (P) Ltd.[3] to state that the only objective of Section 14(2) is that the parties are aware of the award’s existence. Substantive compliance is envisioned and there is no insistence on a specific form of notice. The section does not envisage a procedural compliance of issuance a formal notice since any such insistence on procedural/ technical compliance can be misused to delay enforcement.

The Respondent on September 21, 2022, was aware that the award had been filed and the only pending formality was clearing the balance of the arbitrator’s fees, upon which a formal notice was received on November 18, 2022. Section 14(2) does not require actual receipt of the award. Relying on Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v C.K. Ahuja, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 744, the Supreme Court stated that parties must take steps to scrutinise the award themselves as soon as it becomes accessible, and they are aware of its accessibility. Relying on any procedural compliance will only lead to unnecessary delay on the part of the award debtor.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling establishes a crucial precedent that prevents award debtors from benefiting from delays they themselves cause, thereby upholding the fundamental principle that no party should benefit from their own wrongdoing. By holding that limitation period commences when parties become aware of an award’s existence rather than upon formal notice, the Supreme Court ensures that dilatory tactics cannot be employed to extend the limitation period.

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly Section 34(3), sets a three-month limitation for challenging an arbitral award from the date the party “receives” it. But what does “receives” mean? The Krishna Devi ruling strengthens the view that constructive knowledge — not just physical delivery — can start the limitation clock.

Krishna Devi judgement is a judicial nudge toward substance over form. It tells us: Don’t wait for the envelope — if you know the outcome, act. This principle, though born in the 1940 Act, now breathes life into the 1996 regime, making arbitration in India faster, leaner, and more pragmatic.

[1] 2025 SCC OnLine SC24

[2] (1993) 3 SCC 445

[3] (1988) 4 SCC 3